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Abstract
The strengthening of land rights has been proposed as a policy to reduce fi-
nancial market frictions and promote private investment in low- and middle- 
income countries. But assessments of these potential effects have proven in-
conclusive. One reason may be that research has focused on actors that face 
difficulties accessing credit for reasons other than the security of land tenure. 
We explore the effect of greater tenure security in a setting in which non-land-
related financial market frictions are apt to be mild—that is, among large urban 
industrial enterprises. Exploiting policy variation across Russian regions and 
firm-level survey data, we show that private land rights facilitate credit access 
and promote investment.
1. Introduction
Over the past 2 decades, the strengthening of land rights has become one of the 
most widely discussed policy prescriptions for reducing financial market frictions 
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and promoting private investment in low- and middle-income countries. Land 
ownership, it is said, provides borrowers with an attractive form of collateral that 
can ease access to external finance. Moreover, by raising the cost of expropria-
tion, it has the potential to provide those with land use rights greater assurance 
that a return can be realized on new investments. Though the logic here is not un-
reasonable, convincing empirical support has been elusive. But it is worth noting 
that research to date has concentrated on small-scale producers that inhabit envi-
ronments that may lie beyond the frontiers of formal finance. The literature, that 
is, is devoid of studies focusing on actors in environments in which non-land-
related financial market frictions are apt to be less severe than those confronted 
by small-scale farmers and poor urban households. This article looks to fill that 
gap. We exploit a recent survey of large urban industrial enterprises in Russia and 
a quasi experiment occasioned by the country’s postcommunist land reform to 
explore whether private land ownership increases access to finance and promotes 
investment.
Though Russia launched privatization rapidly in the 1990s, it followed a differ-
ent path than many Central and Eastern European countries. Instead of simul-
taneously privatizing enterprise capital and land, Russia’s privatization program 
applied only to equipment, buildings, and other structures. Land plots remained 
state owned. Largely for reasons of expediency, a fundamental principle of mar-
ket economies—that the ownership of surface objects derives from ownership of 
the land underneath (superficies solo cedit)—was thus initially ignored. Today, 
however, the situation is different. A cursory study of Russia’s contemporary ur-
ban landscape reveals a patchwork of tenure rights. As early as the mid-1990s 
and particularly since 2001, some regions have responded to federal initiatives by 
promoting the privatization of land, including land under otherwise-privatized 
industrial enterprises; others have proceeded much more slowly.
The relationship between land, on the one hand, and finance and investment, 
on the other, has been popularly associated with the Peruvian economist Her-
nando de Soto, who portrays the extension of widespread private land tenure 
(and the institutional infrastructure to support it) as a critical step in the devel-
opment process. Indeed, he describes the inability of entrepreneurs to pledge 
fixed assets, notably land, over which they have user rights but not formal title 
as “the major stumbling block that keeps [the Third World and former Commu-
nist nations] from benefiting from capitalism” (Soto 2000, pp. 6–7). Though it 
has been skeptically received in some quarters, scholarly interest in this relation-
ship—referred to recently as the “de Soto effect” (Besley, Burchardi, and Ghatak 
2012)—has been appreciable (Woodruff 2001). But among sophisticated analyses 
that confront the potential endogeneity of land tenure, findings have been mixed. 
Besley (1995) presents evidence consistent with land rights being unrelated to 
credit access among Ghanaian farmers. Braselle, Gaspart, and Platteau (2002) 
find no systematic relationship between land tenure security and investment 
across household farms in Burkina Faso. And while Field (2005) and Galiani and 
Schargrodsky (2010) find that urban squatters in Lima and Buenos Aires, respec-
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tively, invest more in their properties after being granted formal tenure, their evi-
dence suggests that increased access to credit is not primarily responsible.1
Is the de Soto effect a chimera? Do stronger rights over fixed assets (namely, 
land) neither improve access to credit nor increase investment? We find it plau-
sible that the scholarship to date may have been too restrictive as to the settings 
in which these connections were explored. Indeed, as some of the authors of the 
above-noted studies themselves observe, non-land-related factors may explain 
the weak connection between land rights and credit access. That is, regardless of 
whether or not they have title to their land, the farmers and poor urban house-
holds that have received scholarly attention may face other barriers—for exam-
ple, scale and location—that limit their access to lenders who, all else equal, would 
value titled immovable assets pledged as collateral. The same concerns cannot be 
said to apply to the urban industrial firms that are our focus here.
In the following, we first demonstrate the hypothesized correlations between 
land tenure, on the one hand, and credit access and investment intensity, on the 
other. Surveyed firms, that is, that own their land report both greater ease in ac-
cessing credit and more intense investment activity. These relationships remain 
robust to a wide variety of firm-specific and regional controls, including regional 
fixed effects. While consistent with a de Soto effect, these associations are not in-
terpretable as such given that land tenure may be endogenous. We address that 
possibility here, in part, by exploiting the aforementioned policy variation across 
Russia’s territorial units. Some firms happen to be in regions in which the “price” 
for privatizing urban land is low; and some happen to be in regions in which 
the price is high. Using a proxy for these policy differences to instrument for the 
current tenure status of surveyed firms’ primary production plots—thereby iden-
tifying a local average treatment effect—we continue to observe that firms that 
own their land have both greater access to capital and more intense investment 
agendas.
Though our instrumental variables (IV) strategy mitigates concerns that the re-
lationship between land rights and access to finance is driven by reverse causation 
or omitted firm-level variables, regional land policy may be correlated with rel-
evant regional characteristics. Regional land policy, that is, may itself be endog-
enous. We respond to this concern in three ways. First, we demonstrate that the 
correlations of interest survive the inclusion of regional fixed effects. Second, our 
IV models include a rich set of regional controls plausibly related to firms’ access 
to finance and investment activity. Third, we explore deeper, historical drivers of 
our instrument. Postulating that regional policy reflects both supply and demand 
forces unleashed by postsocialist economic and political liberalization, we isolate 
several variables whose values in 1995 explain a substantial share of the variation 
in the trajectory of regional land policy over the entire reform period. Acknowl-
1 Field and Torero (2008) find that an urban titling program in Peru did not increase commer-
cial lending. Others who have looked at land rights and credit in the context of the more general 
question about investment activity include Alston, Libecap, and Schneider (1996) and Do and Iyer 
(2008).
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edging the nonrandom nature of regional policy enables us to contribute to the 
literature on the political economy of privatization by presenting evidence con-
sistent with high land rents—as captured by regional urbanization rates and per 
capita income—making public officials less prone to privatize assets under their 
control. And controlling for these policy supply factors, we demonstrate that the 
demand for urban land privatization—as measured by industrial output per cap-
ita and the percentage of loss-making enterprises—further explains policy in a 
predictable manner. Finally, in addition to the regression results consistent with 
a de Soto effect in industry, we demonstrate with direct survey responses that 
firms’ managers believe land to be an important source of collateral to secure ex-
ternal loans. For instance, nearly half of the surveyed firms that took ownership 
over their land plots cited improved access to external financing as an extremely 
important motivation.
We elaborate on all of this evidence in the rest of the article. Section 2 lays out 
changes in the policies governing Russia’s nonagricultural commercial lands and 
highlights the persistence of interregional policy variation. Section 3 introduces 
a unique survey of large urban industrial enterprises. In Section 4, we explore 
conditional correlations between the tenure status of enterprises’ primary pro-
duction plot, on the one hand, and their ease in accessing credit and the inten-
sity of their investment activity, on the other. In Section 5, we deploy a measure 
of regional policy variation as an instrument to mitigate concerns about reverse 
causation and firm-level omitted variables. In recognition of the fact that this re-
gional policy variation may itself be endogenous, Section 6 explores its historical 
determinants, which allows us to contribute, in a small way, to the literature on 
the political economy of privatization. Section 7 provides additional robustness 
checks and exploits the survey further to demonstrate that the respondents them-
selves believe in a de Soto effect. Section 8 concludes.
2. Land Policy at the Federal and Regional Levels
Issues surrounding land tenure seem to have been all but forgotten in commen-
tary on the privatization of Russian industry.2 This is odd. Considering the cen-
trality of industry to Soviet-era urban development, some of the choicest real es-
tate in Russia’s largest cities is given over to industry (Bertaud and Renaud 1997). 
Further, given the noncompetitive technologies in use at many Soviet enterprises 
on the eve of market-oriented reforms, land likely accounted for a substantial 
share of enterprise asset value when privatization was launched in the early 1990s. 
Very few commentators on Russia’s privatization, however, have paid attention 
2 This section draws on Khakhalin and Pyle (2009). For examples of the omission of land tenure 
from the literature, see any of the Russia-focused empirical studies referenced in the widely cited 
literature review of Estrin et al. (2009). Even though several speculate as to why privatization seems 
not to have produced the desired results in Russia, none note the potential role of the ambiguous 
rights over land.
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to the split of ownership rights over the complementary land and capital assets or 
thought to attribute the slow pace of industrial restructuring to it.3
Bucking centuries of tradition, Russia’s 1993 constitution enumerated a right 
to private land ownership. But subsequent efforts to give specific form to that 
language—including presidential decrees, chapters in the civil code enacted in 
1994 and 1995, and disparate pieces of legislation—produced a body of law that 
was seen as “incomplete . . . and sometimes ambiguous” (O’Leary and Kaganova 
1997, p. 8).4 Nevertheless, between 1994 and 1997, an estimated 34,500 hectares, 
across roughly 50 Russian federal subjects, were transferred to private enterpris-
es.5 In May 1997, a new presidential decree granted regional administrations 
nearly full discretion in establishing land sale prices. Thereafter, land prices be-
gan to vary significantly across Russia, and the overall pace of enterprise land 
privatization slowed (Kaganova 1998; Limonov, Oding, and Vlasova 2001). Since 
subfederal administrations were given greater control to set lease rates on state-
owned land than tax rates on enterprise-owned land, they had an incentive to 
make land privatization procedures complex, expensive, and time consuming. In 
32 regions, land privatization was banned by laws that contradicted federal legis-
lation, by popular referenda, or by provisions added to the region’s constitution. 
Moscow’s Duma, for instance, passed a resolution that land plots occupied by 
privatized enterprises could be leased but not sold.
Most privatized enterprises initially held the lands they occupied under 
the right of permanent (perpetual) use (PPU), a Soviet-era form of land ten-
ure that grants its holder a right to use and build on a parcel but not to dispose 
of it through, for instance, sale to another party. This form of land tenure, re- 
enumerated in the Russian Civil Code of 1995, was characterized as permanent 
only because a termination date was not specified. If the government did dispos-
sess a PPU holder of its lands, it faced a legal obligation to provide compensation 
at market value.
A breakthrough in the enterprise land privatization process occurred in 2001 
when the Putin administration successfully pushed the Russian Federation Land 
Code through the national legislature. Designed to reinvigorate the process be-
gun in the mid-1990s, it laid out mechanisms to force divestiture of state lands 
under privately owned structures and to unify titles to land and buildings. For 
instance, it called for the ownership of real estate objects to henceforth follow 
ownership of the attached land plot, granted exclusive right to purchase or lease 
state-owned land to the owner of the attached real estate object, gave to private 
3 Exceptions to this rule include Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1995), Heller (1998), and Lewis et 
al. (1999).
4 Presidential Decree 1535, issued in July 1994, spelled out procedures for acquiring the lands 
under neath privatized, nonagricultural enterprises. In conjunction with a 1995 decree that reduced 
the purchase price of enterprise-occupied land, it paved the way for a number of privatized enter-
prises to take ownership of their land plots.
5 This article uses the terms “Russian federal subjects” and “regions” interchangeably. The Russian 
Federation comprises more than 80 federal subjects (including Moscow and St. Petersburg), each 
with equal representation in the Federation Council.
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owners of buildings on land plots owned by other private parties the preemp-
tive right to purchase the land, and prohibited the future privatization of real es-
tate objects without the concurrent privatization of the attached plot (Remington 
2002; World Bank 2006).
Perhaps most notably, the land code sought to bring an end to the right of PPU 
by requiring private enterprises to convert from the Soviet-era form of land ten-
ure to rights of ownership or lease by January 1, 2004. Further, the upper bound 
limiting the price that regional administrations could charge for enterprise land 
was reduced, and their land sale legislation was to be brought into line with fed-
eral law. Although this legislative push did lead to an increase in the reregistra-
tion of enterprise land rights in many regions, its impact was not as great as an-
ticipated. In an effective capitulation to the resistance the new provisions were 
encountering, the original deadline for converting rights of PPU was first pushed 
back 2 years to 2006, then again to 2008, and finally to the summer of 2012.
The response of subfederal jurisdictions to the 2001 land code has varied tre-
mendously. In some municipalities, a substantial share of land—including par-
cels that were unimproved and those under privatized enterprises—was sold to 
the private sector; in others, such as Moscow, the municipal government retains 
an effective ownership monopoly (Kisunko and Coolidge 2007; World Bank 
2006). More recently, the long-awaited Federal Law 212 enacted in July 2007, 
Major Amendments to Land Privatization Legislation, seemed to hold out the 
promise of resolving, once and for all, ambiguities surrounding the ownership 
of enterprise land. But many local administrations continue to put up resistance. 
Although Federal Law 212 laid out a new mechanism for establishing the pur-
chase price of plots, requiring that it not exceed 2.5 percent of the cadastral value 
(20 percent in Moscow and St. Petersburg), evidence suggests that some regions 
responded by rather capriciously increasing cadastral values so as to discourage 
land purchases. Regional and municipal governments have also maintained an 
array of formal and informal barriers to limit competitive access to previously 
unused urban parcels.6 The business press continues to be filled with stories of 
how some region-level bodies attempt to undermine the intent of federal land 
legislation (Vasilieva 2011; Yel’kina 2011; Interfax 2011).
Regional officials, in other words, have effectively been able to manipulate the 
price for privatizing a hectare of urban land. When given the discretion, as in the 
1990s, they have done so explicitly and directly (Kisunko and Coolidge 2007). At 
other times, when their policy autonomy has been more circumscribed in a for-
mal sense, some have tinkered with the price indirectly by arbitrarily raising the 
cadastral values that serve as the basis for a plot’s price. They also have been able 
to raise prices implicitly by putting various bureaucratic obstacles in the way of 
6 One analysis suggests that the inability to access land on transparent terms constitutes as big an 
obstacle to business development in Russia as anywhere in the world (Muir and Shen 2005). Among 
Russian enterprises that have direct experience with them, difficulties in acquiring land are more 
problematic than issues concerning bribery, the courts, or access to finance, all matters that tend to 
receive more attention (World Bank 2006). Similar results have been found in research focusing on 
the barriers to small businesses’ development (Zhuravskaya et al. 2005).
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firms. Regardless of the mechanisms used, this regional variation in the price can 
be seen as exogenous to the decisions of individual firms.
The reforms set in motion over the past 2 decades have been such that indus-
trial enterprises have operated under one of three land tenure regimes. Some have 
formal private title to their land; some lease, making regular rental payments to 
government agencies; and yet others continue to occupy their land under the old 
Soviet-era framework of PPU. As of January 2010, in urban settlements, private 
firms owned 247,800 hectares, compared to 7,108,000 held by the state and mu-
nicipalities. Since the passage of the 2001 land law, this relationship between pri-
vate and state lands has changed dramatically; the ratio of the former to the lat-
ter has grown at roughly 18 percent per year, on average.7 Figure 1 captures the 
sixfold increase from 2001 to 2010 of land owned by private enterprises in urban 
settlements (Gosudarstvennyi doklad 2001–10). 
As suggested above, the national-level data mask a great deal of variation in 
the pace of nonagricultural land privatization across regions in Russia. Compre-
hensive data on land ownership at the level of Russia’s 80-plus territorial subjects 
is difficult to obtain. By far the most complete source of data on regional land 
stocks that we have uncovered was made available by the Federal Agency for the 
Real Estate Cadastre (Roskadastr); these data address stocks as of January 1, 2008. 
Similar data from earlier years were not, to our knowledge, ever made available. 
In March 2009, the agency was subsumed by the Federal Service for Registration, 
Cadastre, and Cartography (Rosreestr).8 Of the 7,875,500 hectares of land in ur-
ban settlements, the Roskadastr data designated roughly 45 percent (3,512,200 
7 With regard to enterprise land alone, the first decade of the 20th century could be described as 
one of rapid privatization, a characterization much at odds with the standard story that in Putin’s 
Russia, privatization stalled and the share of Russia’s gross domestic product produced by private 
enterprise fell (Aslund 2007, p. 251).
8 The Roskadastr web site was the source for the comprehensive regional data. After Roskadastr 
was subsumed by Rosreestr, the site was no longer available.
Figure 1. Land held privately by firms in urban settlements (1,000s of hectares)
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hectares) as residential, commercial, or industrial (RCI) land.9 Of Moscow’s 
109,100 hectares, for instance, roughly 77 percent were so described, as were half 
of St. Petersburg’s 139,900 hectares.10
In the absence of any indicators that describe the uses of land more finely, we 
interpret the ratio of urban RCI land owned by enterprises to that owned by gov-
ernment entities as a good measure of the pace and extent of urban industrial 
land privatization in a particular region. Below we present evidence that this in-
dex of urban industrial land ownership is a good proxy for the policy orientation 
of Russia’s federal subjects vis-à-vis land reform. Table 1 lists the index by territo-
rial subject and the number of enterprises located in each that participated in the 
survey discussed below.
3. Survey of Large Urban Industrial Firms
To understand the effects of industrial land privatization, we collaborated with 
Moscow’s Levada Analytical Centre to design and administer a survey of 359 large 
urban industrial enterprises in the fall of 2009. To focus on firms likely to operate 
on large plots of land, we addressed only those that had at least 500 employees 
in 2007. We also restricted our analysis to former state-owned enterprises that 
had been founded prior to 1986 but privatized prior to 2004. By design, roughly 
half of the firms were from regions with more progressive policies vis-à-vis urban 
land (that is, in the top third of the regions in Table 1). Just under one-fifth of the 
firms were in either Moscow or St. Petersburg, Russia’s two largest cities. The rest 
were distributed relatively equally across cities (each a capital of a territorial sub-
ject) of three different size ranges: 1–3 million, .5 million–1 million, and .25–.5 
million people. In all, the respondents represented 53 territorial subjects.11
Respondents answered general questions regarding their firm and questions 
specifically addressing land-related issues. A series of questions addressed the 
firm’s primary production plot, with separate blocks for firms that owned the 
plot privately (N = 172), those that leased it (N = 131), and those that held it un-
der the right of PPU (N = 56). Table 2 presents characteristics of the firms. 
All respondents were asked to assess, on a scale from 1 to 5, how problem-
atic difficulties in accessing credit are for their operations (with 1 representing 
“not at all” and 5 “extremely problematic”). As shown in Table 2, firms that hold 
9 Formally, Roskadastr’s designation encompasses “lands for residential and commercial struc-
tures as well as lands for industry, transport and communications” (table 9.1, Lands for Residential 
and Commercial Structures, Lands for Industrial and Public Use as Well as Transport and Commu-
nications, and Lands for Other Special Purposes; our translation from the now-defunct Roskadastr 
website).
10 In the Russian capital, a good amount of land is given over to parks and largely undeveloped 
green spaces; within the city limits of St. Petersburg, roughly 20,000 hectares are designated as arable 
agricultural land.
11 Of those firms contacted to participate in the survey, 429 refused categorically, 308 did not re-
fuse outright but did not end up participating for one reason or another (for example, the surveying 
organization had some difficulty in settling on a mutually convenient time), and at 42 firms the nec-
essary respondent was absent (for example, because of illness or vacation). These response rates are 
in no way correlated with regional land policy.
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their primary production plot under PPU rights—the weakest form of tenure—
are more apt to view credit access as a barrier than firms that own or lease their 
land. To shed light on the link between this qualitative variable measuring diffi-
culty accessing credit and a potentially more tangible measure of the financial en-
vironment, for regions with more than five respondents we plotted the regional 
average against regional nominal loan growth between 2008 and 2009 (that is, the 
period roughly contemporaneous with the survey). The resulting relationship is 
negative, rather tight (R2 =.32), and highly statistically significant (p < .01). The 
relevant coefficient implies that when the regional average score indicating diffi-
culty accessing credit rises by .7 of a unit (which, as shown in Table 2, is equiva-
lent to the difference between the average score of firms with PPU rights to their 
plot and those that hold their land privately), regional loan growth falls by about 
6 percent, a substantial effect relative to the sample average of 32 percent.12 Re-
sponding to a similarly scaled question about investment activity at the enterprise 
in 2009 (with 1 representing “no investment activity” and 5 “intense investment 
12 We cannot perform a similar matching of the qualitative question to a tangible performance 
indicator at the firm level because the firms’ identities are not known to us.
Table 2
Characteristics of Firms and Primary Production Plots by Land Tenure Status 
Private Lease PPU
Credit access and investment intensity:
 Difficulty accessing credit (1–5 scale) 2.75+ 2.83 3.46**
 Investment intensity, 2009 (1–5 scale) 2.76* 2.51 2.22*
Firm characteristics:
 Full-time employees 1,249.1 1,368.5 1,599.3
 Years since privatization 14.4 14.9 14.4
 Problems with inadequate working capital, overdue 
accounts receivable, corruption and (nonland)  
taxes (1–5 scale) 3.21 3.26 3.50+
 Population of city in which firm is located (1–5 scale) 3.0** 3.8** 3.0*
 Member of commercial group (%) 30.6 30.4 23.6
 Influence of State Property Fund (0–4 scale) .35 .35 .54
 Influence of nonmanagement labor (0–4 scale) 1.36 1.14 1.31
 Influence of foreigners (0–4 scale) .46 .64* .11**
 Influence of other Russians (0–4 scale) 1.47 1.01** 1.82**
 Profitability in 2007–8 (2–6 scale) 5.38 5.24 5.16
Primary production plot:
 Only plot attached when firm was privatized (%) 40.4 37.4 25.5+
 Attached when firm was privatized (%) 81.9 78.6 78.2
 Most environmentally hazardous (%) 4.7 6.1 3.6
 Located on edge of city (%) 43.9 51.1 54.5
 Nearby firms (1–3 scale) 2.53 2.67+ 2.49
Note. Reported p-values are for t-tests on equality of means for those inside and outside the subgroup. 
PPU = permanent (perpetual) use.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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activity”), firms that own their plots reported greater intensity, and firms operat-
ing under PPU rights indicated less.
Firms in the sample had at the time of the survey, on average, over 1,000 em-
ployees and had been privatized nearly 15 years prior.13 Firms with PPU rights 
reported experiencing the most difficulty with a set of commonly reported prob-
lems—inadequate working capital, overdue accounts receivable, government 
corruption, and (nonproperty) taxes—and those that owned their plots reported 
the least; this latter difference, however, is not statistically significant. About 
one-quarter of respondents reported belonging to a commercial group, some of 
which may have supported internal capital markets and eased financial market 
frictions for their members (Perotti and Gelfer 2001). We observe that the own-
ership profile of firms varies somewhat across land tenure status; for instance, 
foreigners appear to have had less of an ownership presence in firms that hold 
land under PPU rights. Firms that own their plots are, on average, more profit-
able than others, but the difference, according to our rather coarse profitability 
scale of 2–6, is not statistically significant.14
About 80 percent of the plots were attached to the enterprise at the time of its 
privatization. Roughly half of the primary production plots were located on the 
city’s edge, as opposed to somewhere near the center or historic district, and a 
small number had been categorized as the most hazardous type of urban land 
from an environmental perspective.
Among the firms that own their primary production plots, the median year 
of land privatization was 2003. Two-thirds of these plots had been held in PPU 
prior to privatization, whereas the remainder had been leased. The transition 
from lease holding to private ownership became more common in more recent 
years. Sixty-seven firms paid less than the full cadastral value to purchase the plot 
(an average rate of 5.6 percent of the cadastral value, and a median of 2.5 per-
cent), 41 paid the full cadastral value, and 20 reported paying a price tied to the 
annual land tax (an average factor of 9 times the tax amount, and a median of 
5.5), four had “other” arrangements, and the rest did not answer that question.15
4. Plot Tenure Status, Access to Credit, and Investment Intensity
Table 2 documents strong unconditional correlations between the ease of 
access to credit and investment intensity on the one hand and plot tenure sta-
tus on the other. Firms that own their plots reported higher investment activ-
ity and fewer problems with accessing credit. The reverse holds for firms with 
13 The median year of privatization was 1993. All had been privatized by the end of 2004, and 90 
percent of firms surveyed had been privatized prior to 2001.
14 This variable was constructed by summing scaled responses to questions about profitability in 
2007 and 2008 in which a response of 1, in a given year, was equivalent to making a loss, 2 to making 
neither a profit nor a loss, and 3 to making a profit.
15 A substantial majority of firms that owned their plots reported paying a 1.5 percent land tax 
rate; 28 paid less, with the low being .4 percent. The average of all firms that reported a specific rate 
was 1.4 percent.
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PPU rights. In this section, we demonstrate that these correlations survive in a 
multiple- regression framework.
We consider a firm trying to finance an investment project with bank credit. A 
bank is likely to grant a loan (and, therefore, the project is likely to happen) if the 
firm is healthy and/or can provide collateral of sufficient value. We thus model a 
firm’s access to credit and its investment intensity as a function of two broad sets 
of variables: those that capture a firm’s current and expected future performance 
and those that characterize its available collateral, which in our context is its pri-
mary production plot. Among the characteristics of its primary production plot, 
we are most interested in its tenure status; other plot-related characteristics rep-
resent additional controls that potentially influence its value as a collateralizable 
asset.
We estimate the following ordered probit model:
 Ai,j = α + φTi + Controls + εi. (1)
The dependent variable Ai,j is the answer (expressed as the value of an ordered 
variable from 1 to 5) for the ith firm to the jth question ( j = 1 or 2). For j = 1, the 
question addresses the degree to which difficulties with accessing credit pose a 
severe problem for the firm; Ai,1 ranges between 1, denoting no problem at all, 
and 5, denoting a severe problem. For j = 2, the question addresses the intensity 
of the firm’s investment activity (in fixed capital, equipment, buildings, and land) 
in 2009; Ai,2 ranges between 1, denoting no activity at all, and 5, denoting intense 
activity.
The variable Ti is a dummy representing the tenure status of the ith firm’s pri-
mary production plot. In most specifications, Ti equals one if the plot is owned 
privately, and Ti equals zero if it is either leased or held under PPU rights. We 
expect our coefficient of interest, φ, to be negative when firms address the ques-
tion concerning difficulties with accessing credit, and we expect it to be positive 
when they address the question about investment intensity. That is, in line with 
the prediction of the de Soto effect, private tenure should be associated with fewer 
difficulties accessing credit and more intense investment activity. In some spec-
ifications, we include dummies that capture whether the plot is leased or held 
under PPU rights so as to compare these two different forms of land tenure to 
private ownership.
Tables 3 and 4 presents the results from the ordered probit models. Our base-
line specification includes a standard control for the firm’s size, its (log) number 
of full-time employees. To account for the possibility that the temporal sequenc-
ing of firms’ privatization is related to their expected future performance (Gupta, 
Ham, and Svejnar 2008), the baseline specification also controls for the (log) 
number of years since the firm (not the plot) was privatized. Further, to control 
for non-land-related features of its operating environment that plausibly affect 
current and expected future performance, respondents to our survey were asked 
to assess on a scale from 1 to 5 the difficulties posed by four potential problems: 
taxes (not related to property), corruption, overdue accounts receivable, and in-
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adequate (own) working capital (with 1 representing “not at all” and 5 “extremely 
problematic”); the responses across each of these categories were summed and 
then divided by 4.16 Finally, our baseline specification includes a measure for the 
population of the city in which the firm is located, potentially capturing agglom-
eration and/or market-size effects.17
To this baseline specification we add descriptors of the primary production 
plot’s history and geographic location, potentially important determinants of its 
value. These include dummies for being located on the edge of the city, for being 
attached to the firm at the time of the firm’s privatization, for being the only plot 
attached to the enterprise at the time of the firm’s privatization, and for being 
designated as the most dangerous in terms of environmental hazards. An addi-
tional plot-specific control captures on a 1–3 scale the number of enterprises in 
the plot’s immediate vicinity: 1 represents none, 2 represents one or two, and 3 
represents more than two.
We subsequently add variables that describe the firm’s ownership structure, 
believing, in line with an extensive literature, that ownership is related to mea-
sures of firm performance. The inclusion of a dummy variable for membership 
in a commercial group (for example, a financial-industrial group or a holding 
company) is inspired by the finding of Perotti and Gelfer (2001) that such groups 
ease financial market frictions and facilitate the financing of investment for their 
members. Additional ownership variables measure on a 0–4 scale the influence 
of foreigners, the State Property Fund, nonmanagement labor employed by the 
firm, and Russian individuals not employed by the firm. A score of 0 is recorded 
if the given individual, entity, or group has no representation among sharehold-
ers, 1 means that it has representation but little influence, and 4 denotes a great 
deal of influence.18 Brown, Earle, and Telgedy (2006) find that the effect of pri-
vatization on firm productivity is small or even negative in Russia, with the no-
table exception of privatization to foreign investors, which is found to affect firm 
productivity positively. In addition, there is a rich literature that illustrates that 
firms owned by their managers and/or workers perform considerably worse than 
firms with outside owners, be they institutional or individual. Djankov and Mur-
rell (2002), for example, find for countries in the Commonwealth of Independent 
States that privatization to outsiders yields large productivity gains, whereas pri-
vatization to workers is detrimental to firm performance.
We further control for a firm’s recent financial health by including an or-
dered variable, scaled from 2 to 6, constructed by summing answers to questions 
on profitability in 2007 and 2008 in which a response of 1 in a given year indi-
16 This variable can also be thought of as capturing otherwise-unobserved characteristics of the 
respondent that might lead to providing either overly positive or negative subjective assessments of 
the institutional environment. Institutional factors like corruption have been shown to be firm spe-
cific (Johnson, McMillan, and Woodruff 2002).
17 The city size variable is scaled from 1 (cities under a quarter million residents) to 5 (cities over 
3 million residents).
18 Some of our control variables are ordered. In unreported results (available from the authors on 
request), we included them as series of dummies. The results were not affected in any material way.
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cates making a loss, 2 indicates making neither a profit nor a loss, and 3 indi-
cates making a profit. Some models include controls for a set of regional char-
acteristics plausibly connected to regional land policies and the behavior of the 
credit market. Growth of loans to firms over the period 2005–9 captures recent 
financial market development in the region.19 Five additional controls are drawn 
from a well-known expert survey characterizing political and economic differ-
ences across regions: economic liberalization, with a focus on regional privatiza-
tion legislation and jurisprudence; corruption among the economic and political 
elites; the strength of local self-government; the quality and turnover among local 
elites; and a composite index of six other dimensions related to regional democ-
racy.20 In the last two specifications, we add a set of sectoral fixed effects; the final 
specification replaces the regional characteristics with a set of regional fixed ef-
fects.
Tables 3 and 4 reveal a strong correlation between private land ownership and 
both dependent variables. Across specifications, firms that own their plots re-
port less difficulty accessing credit (the negative coefficients for private plot sta-
tus in Table 3) and higher investment intensity (the positive coefficients in Table 
4). Conversely, firms that hold their land under the least secure tenure status—
PPU—report more severe problems accessing credit than private landowners and 
comparatively little investment activity (column 2 in Tables 3 and 4).21 These re-
sults are in line with the de Soto–effect hypothesis that property rights facilitate 
access to credit and stimulate investment.22 We also observe some evidence that 
firms that belong to commercial groups and are located in larger cities report 
fewer problems with accessing credit and that larger and more profitable firms 
engage in investment more intensely.
5. Exploiting Regional Variation in Land Policy
Although the results in Tables 3 and 4 are consistent with the de Soto effect, 
they may be subject to omitted-variable bias. That is, we may have failed to in-
19 The loan growth data are calculated from Bank of Russia (2006, 2010). 
20 For more information on the construction of the variables and the data, see Independent Insti-
tute for Social Policy, Social Atlas of the Russian Regions: Integrated Indexes [in Russian] (http://
atlas.socpol.ru/indexes/index_democr.shtml).
21 The introduction of regional fixed effects reduces the coefficient on plot tenure status in the in-
vestment intensity equation by about half and makes it statistically insignificant (Table 4, column 8), 
which suggests that regional variation is important for identifying the effects of interest.
22 To better assess magnitudes, we converted our ordered dependent variables into binary form 
and estimated probit models. The first new binary variable takes a value of one for firms reporting 
severe problems accessing credit (converted from values 4 and 5 on a scale from 1 to 5) and a value 
of zero for firms reporting few problems (original ordered values 1 and 2). Probit estimates indicate 
that private landownership reduces firms’ probability of being in the group with severe problems 
by about 21 percentage points (while all other right-hand-side variables are held constant at their 
means). The second binary variable takes a value of one for firms reporting intense investment ac-
tivity (converted from values 4 and 5) and a value of zero for firms reporting little activity (values 1 
and 2). Probit estimates indicate that private landownership increases firms’ probability of being in 
the group with intense activity by about 17 percentage points. Results are available from the authors 
on request.
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clude all relevant firm-level controls, including one or more correlated with our 
regressor of interest, the tenure status of the primary production plot. For exam-
ple, imagine that our profitability measure is noisy and does not discriminate well 
between profitable and unprofitable firms. Further, suppose that profitable firms 
have both the funds to purchase their land and a healthy enough balance sheet to 
convince banks to extend credit. In that case, our regressions in Table 3 would 
still pick up a significant correlation between private landownership and ease of 
accessing credit even though there might not be a causal relationship between the 
two.
In this section, we address this possibility by using the regional measure of 
urban industrial land privatization (Table 1) as an index to instrument for the 
tenure status of a firm’s primary production plot.23 As noted above, in spite of 
federal- level efforts to standardize land policy, regional officials have been able to 
influence the price, broadly understood, faced by firms wishing to assume own-
ership of the land they occupy. We interpret the data in Table 1 as capturing this 
variation in land policy across regions in a manner that is exogenous to individ-
ual firms.24 Where the value of the regional land index is high, we consider the 
policy environment conducive to plot privatization: firms incurred a lower cost 
in converting the tenure status of their production plots to private ownership.
Our interpretation of the land index as a suitable proxy for land policy is sup-
ported by anecdotal evidence. Moscow, for instance, which has a particularly low 
23 Altonji, Elder, and Taber (2005) propose an alternative way to address the potential omitted- 
variable bias. Suppose that we have one explanatory variable of interest and a large set of plausible 
controls. Further, assume that our choice of controls is perfect in the sense that the excluded vari-
ables (error term) have no correlation with our explanatory variable of interest and, thus, ordinary 
least squares (OLS) estimation is unbiased. We can then think of such an OLS estimate as providing 
an upper bound on the coefficient of interest; this upper bound corresponds to an estimate under 
ideal conditions of exogeneity. Now, suppose instead that our choice of controls is completely ran-
dom. In that case, the correlation between the variable of interest and relevant unobserved variables 
is the same as the correlation between the variable of interest and observed control variables. Altonji, 
Elder, and Taber (2005) show how to use this assumption (in place of the no- correlation assump-
tion) to obtain a lower-bound estimate on the coefficient of interest. We perform the above-men-
tioned sensitivity analysis using Stata’s user-written program rcr.ado (Krauth 2011), which has two 
limitations: it estimates only OLS and can handle at most 25 controls. For this exercise, we thus per-
form OLS regressions of access to credit and investment intensity on all explanatory variables with 
the exception of regional fixed effects and ownership influence (the latter were not jointly statisti-
cally significant at the 5 percent level). Excluding these two groups of variables allows us to include 
fewer than 25 controls. Our results for the access-to-credit regressions turn out to be robust. Moving 
from an assumption of no correlation to one of equal correlation increases the magnitude of  the 
coefficient on private landownership (from −.36 to −.57). A conservative confidence interval (that 
is, with the lower bound for the lower estimate and higher bound for the higher estimate) does not 
contain 0. Our results for investment-intensity regressions are partially robust. Moving from an as-
sumption of no correlation to one of equal correlation leaves the point estimate of the coefficient on 
private landownership virtually intact (at .37), however, with a much larger standard error. As a re-
sult, a conservative confidence interval contains 0. Results are available from the authors on request.
24 A claim of exogeneity implies that the regional share of private land is not influenced by any of 
the surveyed firms that own their primary production plot. Eleven of the 359 firms in the database, 
however, do own a plot whose size accounts for at least 10 percent of the private land in the region 
(the numerator in the land index). To ensure that our instrumental variables (IV) results are not 
driven by these firms, we reestimated the models in Table 6 without them. Our results of interest did 
not change appreciably.
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value in the index, formally banned the sale of land in the 1990s, and despite the 
passage of the 2001 land code, policy in the capital city has remained hostile to 
plot privatization (Kisunko and Coolidge 2007).
We would, however, like to provide more systematic evidence that the index 
indeed captures land policy variation across regions. We thus examine the re-
sponses to a survey question asking firms that had assumed ownership of their 
land to assess on a 1–5 scale the severity of eight potential obstacles in privatizing 
their primary production plot. Just over half of the 169 firms that answered this 
question chose 1 in response to “opposition of local officials,” indicating little to 
no opposition. Just under 10 percent of firms, however, chose 5, reflecting that 
local officials had put up severe roadblocks to the process’s completion. The aver-
age response was 2.1.
If our land index captures the policy variation that we claim, we would expect it 
to explain the variation in the response to this question. That is, we would expect 
a negative correlation between its value and the assessment of individual firms—
in particular, those that had experienced the process of plot privatization from 
beginning to end—as to the degree of opposition presented by government offi-
cials. We present tests for this relationship in Table 5. Controlling for the same 
firm and plot characteristics we included in the models in Tables 3 and 4, as well 
as for the seven other perceived barriers to plot privatization, we see that firms 
owning their primary production plots (column 1) are less likely to characterize 
government opposition as a significant barrier to plot privatization if they are 
located in regions in which the index of land privatization is high.25 This effect is 
statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
Our identification strategy relies on an assumption that firms make decisions 
about the tenure status of their plots in response to a regional policy environment 
that affects the price of privatizing their plots. Of course, some firms took own-
ership of their plots early in the postcommunist period, responding to reforms 
in the 1990s; the majority, however, privatized their land more recently, after the 
passage of the land code. By using an instrument that measures the regional stock 
of urban land that had been privatized by 2008, we assume that the pattern of re-
gional policy variation in the year prior to the survey (that is, 2008) is similar to 
the pattern that prevailed earlier. That is, in general, regions that were amenable 
(hostile) to plot privatization later in the reform period were also more amenable 
(hostile) earlier on. We put this assumption to the test in columns 2 and 3 of Ta-
ble 5. In column 2, we estimate the same model for firms that had privatized their 
plots before 2005; this leaves us with about two-thirds of the firms that reported 
owning their primary production plots at the time of the survey in 2009. In col-
umn 3, we include only firms that had privatized their plots after 2000. Again, 
we are left with about two-thirds of all firms that reported owning their plots. 
In both samples, we observe that firms’ perception of government opposition is 
25 We control for the average of a firm’s responses to the other questions about barriers so as to 
diminish the likelihood that results are driven by unobserved variation in firms’ willingness to re-
spond with systematically higher or lower responses across all barriers.
This content downloaded from 157.193.218.215 on March 09, 2017 01:48:02 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
 Land Rights and Credit 469
inversely related to the land index. That is, whether we consider the two-thirds 
of firms that privatized their plots early or the two-thirds of firms that privatized 
their plots late, our land index explains perceptions of government resistance, a 
finding consistent with the index capturing a consistent pattern of regional policy 
variation across time.
Having provided evidence that the land index can serve as a reasonable proxy 
for regional land policy, we now turn to its suitability as an instrument to identify 
the causal effect of plot tenure status on access to credit and investment intensity. 
To qualify as suitable, the index must predict plot tenure status when other fac-
tors are held constant. That is, a firm in a region in which the index indicates that 
policy is friendlier to private land tenure should be more likely than a similar firm 
in a region with a less amenable policy environment to report owning its primary 
production plot. This condition is easily tested. And, indeed, our first-stage re-
gressions in Table 6 document strong predictive power.
In addition, a suitable instrument must satisfy the exclusion restriction. In 
other words, it should be uncorrelated with the error term (with all the omitted 
factors affecting access to credit and investment intensity) in the second-stage 
regressions. Although we cannot test this condition, we believe that the land in-
dex is likely to satisfy it. On the one hand, it is difficult to conceive of a channel 
(other than landownership) through which land policy might affect a firm’s ac-
cess to credit and investment intensity. On the other hand, while it is possible 
that regional variation in land policy is correlated with regional variation in other 
factors that might influence bank behavior and/or the investment climate (for 
example, other dimensions of the regional institutional environment), we do in-
clude the same diverse set of six regional controls (discussed in Section 4) in both 
the first and second stages of all IV specifications: growth of loans to firms over 
the period 2005 to 2009, economic liberalization with a focus on regional pri-
vatization legislation and jurisprudence, corruption of the economic and politi-
Table 5
Opposition of Local Officials as a Barrier to Privatizing the Plot (1–5 Scale)
Timing of Plot Privatization
All 
(1)
Before 2005 
(2)
After 2000 
(3)
(Log) ratio of land owned by firms to  
that owned by government (%) −.322* −.544** −.382*
(.150) (.174) (.182)
N 168 105 108
Pseudo R2 .19 .29 .29
Note. Values are the results of ordered probit regressions. Robust standard errors, adjusted for clustering 
at the regional level, are in parentheses. All models include controls for other barriers, sector, plot charac-
teristics, and owner.  “Other barriers” include problems defining and agreeing on plot boundaries, the in-
adequacy of resources (difficulty accessing credit), the high cost of completing documents to purchase land, 
the incomplete process of assigning land to the appropriate government level, and the absence of documents 
conferring rights to land.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
This content downloaded from 157.193.218.215 on March 09, 2017 01:48:02 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
470 The Journal of LAW & ECONOMICS
cal elites, the strength of local self-government, the quality and turnover of local 
elites, and a composite index capturing the quality of democracy.
Even if our instrument satisfies these two conditions, it might fall short of iden-
tifying the population-average effect of private landownership on our two out-
come measures because of essential heterogeneity (Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil 
2006). In the process of producing controlled variation in the suspected endog-
enous regressor (plot tenure status), the instrument necessarily restricts identifi-
cation to the subpopulation of firms for whom plot tenure status would change 
because of the instrument (Imbens and Wooldridge 2007). That is, we identify a 
local average treatment effect (Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin 1996) of private land-
ownership on both access to credit and investment intensity for those firms that 
would not assume ownership of their plots if located in a region with a lower 
value for the land index but would assume ownership if located in a region with a 
higher value for the index. One should be cautious when extrapolating this local 
average treatment effect to other subpopulations of firms, especially if firms that 
expect to benefit more from plot ownership (in the sense, for example, of hav-
ing better access to credit) are also more likely to respond to a policy friendly to 
land privatization by assuming ownership of their plot. Indeed, if firms sort on 
the gain in this manner, then the local average treatment effect may identify the 
causal effect of private landownership for a subpopulation of firms that would 
benefit from it (Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil 2006). In this case, the estimated 
effect would be upwardly biased compared to the average treatment effect for the 
population as a whole.
We present the results of this IV approach in Table 6.26 The first-stage IV re-
gression results show that the regional land policy index strongly predicts private 
plot status across specifications. Observing that surveyed firms are more likely 
to have taken ownership of their primary production plot in regions where the 
index of urban industrial land privatization is high, even after controlling for a 
number of firm- and plot-specific characteristics, gives us confidence that the 
index is capturing the land policy variation that we have argued it does and is 
therefore an appropriate instrument. The second-stage results show a statistically 
significant negative relationship between the predicted value of private plot status 
and the firm’s reported difficulty in accessing credit, while finding a statistically 
significant positive relationship with the firm’s investment intensity. This is true 
for all specifications. The IV estimation results reinforce the ordered probit re-
26 Given that our dependent variables (access to credit and investment intensity) are ordinal, 
while the endogenous regressor, plot tenure status, is binary, we cannot rely on the standard two-
stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedure, which is known to work only approximately in 
these circumstances (Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006). Instead, we estimate the model in one step 
by maximum likelihood methods using a Stata routine, ssm, which, in turn, is a wrapper for another 
routine, gllamm, designed to estimate endogenous switching models. The setup in these models is 
comparable to 2SLS: the switching equation (probit) is similar to the first-stage regression and mod-
els plot tenure status as a function of the land index (the instrument) and all other explanatory vari-
ables; the outcome equation (ordered probit) is similar to the second-stage regression and models 
credit access or investment intensity as a function of (predicted) plot tenure status and all other 
explanatory variables (for details, see Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh 2006).
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gression results in Tables 3 and 4. Our IV regressions, in other words, provide 
further support for a de Soto effect in industry. We should note, however, that 
our IV effects are consistently larger than the probit effects found in Tables 3 and 
4, a difference consistent with the phenomenon of sorting on the gain and thus 
consistent with the possibility that the strength of the de Soto effect does not gen-
eralize to all firms.
6. Understanding Regional Variation in Land Policy
By introducing a source of regional variation that plausibly explains an indi-
vidual firm’s plot tenure status, our IV strategy allows us to address identification 
problems relating to reverse causality and firm-level omitted variables. However, 
we recognize that land policy was unlikely to have been randomly assigned in the 
manner of a true natural experiment. And although we control for other, non-
land-related regional factors that may explain firms’ access to credit and invest-
ment activity, we recognize that we may not observe one or more additional re-
gional variables that explain land policy and the financial environment. That is, 
it is possible that regional land policy is itself endogenous. We thus looked, ulti-
mately without success, for deeper, more historical drivers of regional land policy 
that could serve as plausible alternative instruments. This search, of course, was 
complicated by the requirement that any alternative instrument’s effect on our 
dependent variables occurs exclusively through the land tenure channel.
Despite failing to identify convincing alternatives that satisfy the exclusion re-
striction, we see value in exploring the historical determinants of regional land 
policy. For although the postcommunist transition has produced an abundance 
of articles addressing the effect of asset privatization, it has engendered few that 
identify factors governing public officials’ decisions to relinquish ownership over 
some assets but not over others.27 To understand the forces that might be at work 
here, we highlight that status of land as a rent-generating asset. Where rents are 
greater, one might surmise, potentially corrupt officials should be more reluctant 
to cede ownership control. That is, where land values are higher, the supply of 
policies conducive to plot privatization should, all else equal, be lower. And, con-
trolling for this determinant of policy supply, we would expect that regions with 
stronger industrial interests would have a policy environment more amenable to 
private ownership in equilibrium.
To proxy for these underlying forces, we turn to several variables as measured 
in 1995, soon after market and political liberalization but before land plots had 
begun to be systematically privatized in any of Russia’s regions. A region’s ur-
27 Some researchers focus on officials’ concern with the unemployment and political opposition 
that might arise from simultaneous privatization of all state enterprises without focusing on why 
some might be privatized before others (Glaeser and Sheinkman 1996; Dewatripont and Roland 
1995). Gupta, Ham, and Svejnar (2008) use firm-level data from the Czech Republic to show that 
those privatized first been more profitable and operated in downstream industries subject to greater 
demand uncertainty—which suggests, they argue, that officials had an efficiency objective in choos-
ing which to privatize first.
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banization rate and its per capita income capture its urban land values, the driver 
of policy supply. Where they are greater, we hypothesize, the land policy index 
will be lower. Officials in such regions, that is, should be more resistant to fed-
eral privatization initiatives so as to preserve the more lucrative, rent- generating 
opportunities that accompany control over higher-valued land. We capture the 
demand for urban industrial land privatization with measures of the regional 
percentage of loss-making enterprises and industrial production per capita. In re-
gions where the latter is higher, the demand for institutions that facilitate private 
ownership of urban industrial land should be greater. However, where the liber-
alization of prices in 1992 uncovered a local economy ill prepared for markets, as 
measured by the prevalence of loss-making firms in 1995, the immediate demand 
for land privatization should be less.
We present a test of these hypotheses in column 1 of Table 7. As hypothesized, 
regional income per capita and urbanization, as measured in 1995, are negatively 
related to the land policy index. In addition, the two demand-side proxies explain 
policy variation in the expected manner. Higher levels of industrial production 
per capita and a smaller percentage of loss-making firms are both associated with 
more urban land privatization. Each of these relationships is statistically signifi-
cant at either the 1 percent or the 5 percent level. Early post-Soviet variation in 
regional economies, in sum, explains a good deal of the variation in regional land 
policy over the subsequent decade-plus period.
Consistent with this story that the index reflects forces that have influenced 
land policy over an extended period of time, we would expect that more recent 
values of the same variables would have less predictive power. Column 2 con-
firms that this is the case. Values from 2007 explain much less of the variation in 
the land policy index than the values of those same variables from 1995. Further-
ing this line of reasoning, we conduct Davidson-MacKinnon tests. We observe 
Table 7
Regional Determinants of Urban Land Privatization
1995  
(1)
2007  
(2)
1995 
(3)
2007 
(4)
(Log) industrial production per capita .76** .43** .70** .00
(.143) (.125) (.180) (.150)
Share of loss-making enterprises −.02** −1.89 −.02* −.76
(.007) (1.575) (.009) (1.431)
(Log) income per capita −.52* −.27 −.46 −.20
(.257) (.283) (.292) (.253)
Share of population that is urban −.02* −.01 −.02* .00
(.008) (.009) (.008) (.009)
Fitted values for the other year .14 .96**
(.288) (.220)
R2 .428 .282 .430 .435
Note. Values are the results of ordinary least squares regressions. Standard errors are in parentheses. The 
constant is not reported. The dependent variable is the land index as measured on January 1, 2008. N = 76.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
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in column 3 that inserting as an additional control the fitted value based on 2007 
variables from column 2 adds effectively no predictive power to the 1995 vari-
ables. Conversely, as can be seen in column 4, the fitted value from the model 
based on 1995 values overwhelms the predictive power of the 2007 measures.28
7. Robustness and Additional Survey-Based Evidence
To supplement the IV specifications, we return to potential sources of reverse 
causality in the correlations highlighted in Tables 3 and 4. First, with respect to 
the regressions in Table 3, it is worth noting that the dependent variable is not 
time specific. Firms characterizing credit conditions as favorable at the time of 
the survey may have been influenced by a favorable financial environment in the 
preceding years. It is thus not inconceivable that favorable credit conditions in, 
say, 2007 or 2008 facilitated subsequent land purchases. Causality, that is, might 
run from credit access to land acquisition rather than the other way around. We 
address this potential problem through the IV strategy presented in Table 6. But 
we can address it in an another way by repeating the regressions of Table 3 while 
excluding from the sample firms that privatized their plots in the most recent 
years. In Table 8 we do precisely this. The first column includes all sample firms 
and simply repeats the regional-fixed-effects specification in column 8 of Table 3. 
Subsequent columns represent the specification but progressively eliminate firms 
that privatized their plots until finally eliminating those that privatized their plots 
after 2005. The number of firms gradually diminishes, but the relationship be-
tween private plot status and access to credit remains intact. If anything, the coef-
ficient on plot tenure status becomes even greater, which suggests that the possi-
ble reverse-causation explanation outlined above is not a concern.
A slightly different reverse-causality concern arises in the investment inten-
sity regressions. Recall that the investment question is time specific; firms, that 
is, were asked about activity in 2009. We thus cannot rule out the possibility 
28 When we reestimate the models from Table 6 using the 1995 structural measures as alternative 
instruments, the relationships between land tenure, on the one hand, and credit access and invest-
ment intensity, on the other, remain much the same.
Table 8
Plot Tenure Status and Access to Credit, by Year after Privatization
All Firms 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005
Private −.297* −.348* −.313+ −.333+ −.403* −.408+
(.151) (.151) (.162) (.170) (.193) (.223)
N 326 314 296 284 275 269
Pseudo R² .21 .10 .10 .11 .11 .12
Note. Values are the results of ordered probit regressions and include controls for plot and owner charac-
teristics and sector and regional fixed effects. Standard errors, clustered at the regional level, are in paren-
theses.
+ p < .10.
* p < .05.
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that a portion of 2009 investment includes payment for the primary production 
plot. To eliminate this as a possible explanation for the relationships highlighted 
above, we redefine our independent variable of interest to be one only if the firm 
owned its plot prior to 2009. We then repeat the ordered probit regressions of 
Table 4 and the IV regressions of Table 5. The results, reported in Table 9, con-
firm our previous findings that private landownership drives investment activity 
and not the other way around.
We also wish to draw attention to questions from the survey that solicited re-
spondents’ opinions about the relationship between land and credit. Economic 
research tends to discount evidence gleaned from asking respondents for their 
personal thoughts on the relationship between two variables; it tends to be bet-
ter form to demonstrate the relationship between those variables with statistical 
and econometric tools. But having done this already, we look to specially crafted 
survey questions for additional confirmation of a de Soto effect. One question, 
for instance, addressed prevailing norms requiring the pledge of land as collateral 
to secure external financing: “According to your experience, and those of your 
business colleagues . . . how frequently do banks demand, as collateral to secure 
a long-term loan, the plot of land on which the firm’s production takes place?” 
Of all respondents, 38.3 percent characterized the practice as extremely common 
(by giving a response of 5 on a 1–5 scale), and over half responded with a 4 or a 5. 
Although this evidence indicates that pledging land facilitates access to credit, the 
wording of the question does not directly address the importance of land tenure. 
Fortunately, firms that had taken ownership of their plot were specifically asked 
about their motivation, and 42.4 percent of them cited access to external lending 
as an extremely important factor (5 on a 1–5 scale). Perhaps not surprisingly, this 
motive was even more popular among managers at firms that privatized their 
plots after the passage of the land code, when financial markets were better de-
veloped.
Finally, although we do not want to read too much into it, we highlight a note-
worthy correlation between our survey evidence and regional macroeconomic 
outcomes. Extrapolating from the enterprise-level finding that private land ten-
ure reduces financial market frictions and promotes investment, we might expect 
that regions that privatized land earlier would subsequently demonstrate higher 
levels of growth. Indeed, this is what we observe. For each region in our survey, 
we compute the average year that surveyed firms reported having privatized their 
primary production plots (for those that reported having taken ownership of 
them). Regressing the percentage change in regional gross product across two pe-
riods (2002–7 and 2002–9) on this measure, we find statistically significant nega-
tive relationships (at the 5 percent level). That is, in those regions in which firms 
took ownership of their plots in an earlier year on average, the growth rates in the 
aftermath of the passage of the land code were higher.
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8. Conclusion
We have investigated the financial impact of private land tenure in a setting in 
which non-land-related credit market frictions are apt to be relatively mild. In 
the eyes of commercial lenders, large and well-established urban enterprises are 
not the equals of either poor farmers or the denizens of sprawling slums. So from 
the standpoint of identifying a de Soto effect, they would seem to be more appro-
priate units of analysis. We do indeed observe that plot ownership is associated 
with greater success in accessing external financing and more intense investment 
activity in our sample of large, well-established industrial firms, which lends sup-
port for the presence of a de Soto effect among this group.
As have the authors of prior studies, we grapple with endogeneity concerns. 
They are twofold. First, instead of capturing a de Soto effect, it is not inconceivable 
that the conditional correlations arise from omitted firm-level variables and/or 
reverse causation. Our IV strategy, which exploits substantial land-related policy 
variation across Russia’s federal subjects, minimizes these potentialities. How-
ever, this strategy raises its own concerns. For one, the local average treatment 
effect that we estimate, and by consequence the strength of the de Soto effect that 
we identify, may not generalize to all firms. In addition, regional land policy may 
itself be endogenous. Though this is hardly a trivial matter, we again draw atten-
tion to two pieces of evidence suggesting that the identified relationships are not 
a function of unobserved regional variation: first, the correlation between pri-
vate land tenure and financial outcomes survives the inclusion of regional fixed 
effects, and, second, the IV specifications include a rich set of regional controls. 
Finally, by way of concluding, we once again highlight the responses of the firms’ 
managers to direct questions. When pressed to identify a motivation for taking 
ownership of their land, managers at large industrial firms pointed to its value as 
a pledgeable asset. To the actors on the ground, in other words, the de Soto effect 
is a reality.
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